### AT: Chernus

#### Your psycho-analytic understanding is pop psychology – it presents little actual evidence for the existence of the psychological condition and it over-simplifies nuclear attachment as social fantasy.

\*Chernus is wrong – his fundamental understanding of psychology is bankrupt and assumes that there is a psychological condition to pursue nuclear madness – social sciences prove that this is incorrect – his description of the bomb is just a non-falsifiable image

Summers 91, Ph.D. Department of Psychology,. Mount Allison University. (Craig, Nuclear Texts & Contexts Spring No. 6)

The only evidence for numbing in the book is Lifton’s observations of victims in Hiroshima, which are then linked to potential victims of the contemporary nuclear threat. Lifton himself recently associated the thought processes in perpetrating Nazi mass killing, and in contemporary “perpetrators” of the nuclear threat, which would have been very relevant to reference here (Lifton and Markusen, 1990). The tendency throughout Nuclear Madness is to increasingly leave the initial evidence and begin describing events as schizophrenic, neurotic or mad. The mental health metaphors in Nuclear Madness are rooted in pre-1950s psychoanalysis. (Even continual reference to “The bomb” rather than “smart missiles,” for example, is outdated.) Chernus states Psychologists may identify nuclear weapons with interpersonal hostility, dominance needs, repressed rage, or magical defenses against insecurity. Freudians will find a mapping of infantile omnipotence desires. Jungians will find archetypal patterns of all sorts. Theologians will consider the bomb a mapped replication of our traditional image of God. But all will attest the existence of social fantasy. (p. 32. Infantile omnipotence desires? All will attest to the existence of social fantasy? **Nuclear Madness does**, but it **is** surely **a step backwards** for any reader attempting to learn something of explanations in contemporary political psychology. In relying on clinical metaphors from over forty years ago, Chernus has tied his philosophy to a clinical approach with little actual evidence, and which is generally no longer accepted. Psychic numbing and mental illness could be used successfully if not treated as just a metaphorical explanation for nuclear irrationality. This is a difference between Lifton’s (1967) actual psychiatric observations and Chernus’s numbing metaphor. But Nuclear Madness dwells on descriptive images and similes, not actually pursuing responses to the nuclear threat using either side of psychology: (a) the experimental and observational bases, which have been extensively documented, or (b) clinical psychopathology, which would be worth seriously pursuing. One could propose very real psychiatric grounds for the suicidal nature of being a passive bystander or having vested interests in the nuclear arms race (see Charny, 1986). Masking, numbing, rationalizing, or however ignoring the potential for nuclear omnicide is a psychological process that poses a very real threat to human life, and may thus fit the criteria for inclusion as a pathological disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). People with different political agendas could make completely different conclusions using the material in Nuclear Madness. It is also the case that completely different premises and images could be used to arrive at the same conclusions. A discussion of sexual and pornographic images of the nuclear threat in Rosenbaum (1978) is equally metaphorical. It is descriptive, but not explanatory. Perhaps no real explanation is necessary in Nuclear Madness, though, or even any conclusions on religious thinking or psychological processes. Chernus’s description of “the bomb” as “a symbol of neurotic ambivalence” (p. 67; also 56, 61) is almost just an abstract, artistic image. This would be okay if presented this way in the introduction. As it is, though, we are misled from the title on into thinking that this book will provide an understanding of psychological perceptions and responses to the nuclear threat.

### K 1

#### Framework – the k must prove that the whole plan is bad – weighing the AFF is vital to fair and predictable engagement – allowing the neg to negate only small parts doesn’t disprove the desirability of the plan – the ballot should simulate the plans enactment and test whether it’s better than the status quo or competitive alternative

**Turn: our focus on preventing death is life-affirming**

\*addressing suffering is critical – attempting to banish compassion requires us to shield ourselves from troubling awareness which destroys vale to life in the process. That’s Frazer

**Frazer 6**

The Review of Politics (2006), 68: 49-78 Cambridge University Press

Michael Frazer's research focuses on Enlightenment political philosophy and its relevance for contemporary political theory. His current book project, “The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today,” defends a psychologically holistic approach to political reflection through an examination of such authors as David Hume, Adam Smith and J. G. Herder. Dr. Frazer has also published articles on Maimonides, Nietzsche, John Rawls and Leo Strauss in such journals as "Political Theory" and "The Review of Politics." After receiving his B.A. from Yale University and his Ph.D. from Princeton University, Dr. Frazer spent the 2006-7 academic year as a postdoctoral research associate in the Political Theory Project at Brown University.

Assistant professor – HARVARD

There is a second way in which the painful experience of compassion can threaten human excellence. Not only do we risk developing contempt for all but the suffering masses, but we also risk developing contempt for the compassion that forces us to suffer with them. The terrible experience of shared suffering might lead some of the would-be great on a futile quest to abolish human misery. Others, however, are likely to conclude that their sympathetic pain could be most efficiently relieved by extirpating the faculties responsible for it. When we do not hate the suffering of others, but only our own sharing of this suffering, we seek only to banish compassion from our own breasts. Doing so, however, requires us to shield ourselves from the troubling awareness of our fellows' plight, to sever the imaginative and emotional bonds which connect us to others. It requires that we turn against our own strength of intelligence and imagination, that we sacrifice knowledge for ignorance by denying our insights into the human condition. Some of us might succeed in turning ourselves into such isolated, unthinking beings, but such individuals are not destined for creative achievement.

By contrast, the natural philosopher, poet, or psychologist—the born and inevitable unriddler of human souls—could no more destroy his own sense of compassion than he could abolish the human suffering which compassion compels him to share. A futile quest to extirpate his sympathetic sentiments would only turn such an individual against the world, against life, and against himself; in the end, it might even destroy him. Zarathustra does not pass the greatest test of his strength by purging compassion from his psyche. To the contrary, he affirms his painful experience of the emotion as creativity-enhancing and life-promoting. In doing so, Nietzsche's protagonist warns against those who unduly oppose compassion as well as those who unduly celebrate it. Both sides treat pain as something to be soothed away rather than harnessed for creative purposes; they differ only in whether the pain to be alleviated is our own or that of others. From the ethically authoritative perspective of life, both can be seen as opponents of human flourishing.

**There is no universal foundation for politics. Metaphorically substituting one psychic relation for all politics fails. Their reduction of politics to confronting the death drive closes off successful innovations in political strategy and means their strategy is counterproductive**

\*representation of death are good – silence on possibilities of death and suffering are critical in order to identify necessary courses of action to craft disaster response mechanisms or it makes extinction and policy failure inevitable. That’s Kleinman and Kleinman.

**Boggs 1993** (Carl, Intellectuals and the crisis of Modernity P. 138-140, net library)

The search for universal microfoundations of political action is surely futile, since the "foundations" typically rest upon rather arbitrary, static, and ultimately problematic notions confined to the sphere of observable phenomena. Such phenomena are, of course, embedded in the very institutional and ideological fabric of the given (thus not-yet-transformed) world. It is probably safe to assume that any process of social transformation will give rise to novel, divergent, and perhaps even contradictory motivational impulses. Emergent social forces and movements are likely to create numerous "choice" modalities that enter into collective action: nationalism, religion, ethnicity and race, gender, culture, and so forth. They also involve actors other than workers at the point of production. Instead of an abstract microfoundations, therefore, what is required is an understanding of historical conditions and collective responses to them as filtered through different social contradictions and different forms of ideological hegemony. While Przeworksi at times refers to such concerns, they never become a matter of theoretical interest. It is striking that Przeworski's familiarity with Gramsci did not sensitize him to the concept of "social bloc." Employed frequently throughout the Prison Notebooks, this concept referred to a unique merging of objective conditions and subjective forces in the growth of movements and parties—for example, the role of nationalism in galvanizing radical opposition at certain historical junctures. Borrowing from Gramsci, it can be argued that nationalism was a vital mobilizing force behind virtually all twentieth-century Communist revolutions—from Russia to China, from Yugoslavia to Cuba. 98 The postwar successes of the Italian Communists are inexplicable without taking into account the durable impact of the patriotic Resistance movement of 1943-1945, which transformed the PCI from a marginal force into a mass party. More recent developments—Polish Solidarity, the rise of Islamic radicalism, the role of liberation theology in Latin America—attest to the enormous mobilizing power of both nationalism and religion. In none of these cases, moreover, has popular support come strictly from labor; it has been multiclass in both its appeals and social base. The point is that collective motivational impulses toward social change are best understood as an expression of concrete historical forces rather than as a disparate set of personal choices. Rational-choice theory only serves to obscure that understanding. The quest for an all-encompassing social-psychological pattern applicable to every form of social change is illusory. Efforts to uncover a single microfoundation of collective action, while seductive for positivist social science, cannot be a substitute for painstaking historical analysis. How can we arrive at generalizations about human behavior from one historical situation to the next, from one geopolitical situation to the next, from one level of analysis (e.g., family or state) to the next? The immense variations of social identity and political strategy are better grasped as part of the lived everyday experiences of people whose energies shape the formation of popular movements. The Gramscian concept of "social bloc" presents yet other difficulties for Przeworski's conclusions: the mass base of social-democratic and Communist parties, in virtually every setting, has always been multiclass. The idea of a purely working-class party can only be found in some texts of orthodox Marxism. Thus both the Russian and Chinese revolutions were forged explicitly on a foundation of multiclass alliances (labor, peasantry, national bourgeoisie), while the architects of structural reformism (Bernstein, Jaures, and, later, Togliatti) all stressed a similar multiclass strategic principle. And there is no evidence to suggest that abandonment of a strict proletarian identity automatically produces deradicalizing outcomes, or that it leads to intractable dilemmas of the sort addressed by Przeworski. Indeed, the shift toward a multiclass strategy, where it adapts to existing political imperatives, may have quite the opposite impact. Of course Przeworski is correct to insist, after E. P. Thompson, that class formation is not a necessary reflex of people's location in the sphere of production but takes place on the terrain of collective struggles—that, in other words, there is no strict correlation between class and politics. At the same time, he seems to embrace the labor metaphysic insofar as he never addresses the possibility of historical agents other than the working class. (Though Przeworski does not linger over definitions, by "labor" he appears to have in mind essentially blue-collar workers.) This surprisingly orthodox premise surfaces in three ways: in the primary attention devoted to labor as a category of analysis; in the notion that multiclass blocs are a source of deradicalization; and in the pessimistic conclusion that the decline of class politics in parliamentary systems destroys real prospects for an alternative to capitalism. This is not the place to take up the issue of class as a theoretical concern. But it is worth mentioning that Przeworski's focus obscures the multiple sources of conflict in advanced capitalism, thus closing off exploration of popular movements (urban protest, feminism, ecology, etc.) that depart from the (presumed) class basis of radical politics. Whatever the present status of such movements, their persistence in Europe and North America well after the sixties raises basic questions about the familiar "transition to socialism"—questions that, however, do not indulge Przeworski's academic pessimism. 99 One need not be a partisan of new social movements or the Greens to concede that questions of strategy take on a different meaning today than in the past, given vastly different factors at work. The very idea of proletarian socialism is a residue of earlier history and bears little relationship to the modern setting where many conditions challenge the old paradigm: the decline of manufacturing, rise of the new middle strata, bureaucratization, growth of mass education and the culture industry, breakdown of the family, and ecological crisis. Przeworski mentions some of these factors in passing, but his neoclassical methodology excludes them from serious consideration. There is grudging recognition that class forces are no longer the sole determinant of social change, but for analytical Marxism the idea of reconstituting theory to take this new reality into account seems completely out of the question. Thus Przeworski admits that a nonclass basis of conflict does exist but also holds that all conflict is ultimately about class issues and class formation. Popular struggles are, directly or indirectly, class struggles insofar as they influence the capacity of labor to unite against capital. 100

### 2ac – condo

#### Condo is a voting issue –

#### a) Skew – condo allows them to arbitrarily kick arguments destroying effective 2ac strategy

#### b) Decision-making – the need to concede is an important skill to understand arg interaction – allowing them to arbitrarily kick positions prevents this skill

#### c) C/I – One condo allows them to pick their best offense before the round and is reciprocal

#### d) Reject the team to deter abuse and rejecting the arg links to all our offense

**Their impact claims are seriously totalizing and reductionist**

**Robinson and Tormey, 2004** (Andrew and Simon, School of Politics at the University of Nottingham, “Zizek is not a Radical?” http://info.interactivist.net/article.pl?sid=04/03/25/1341209)

These critiques, however, are rooted in an "old" left prone to essentialism, unfounded "objective" claims and simplifying vulgarisations -- precisely the reasons for the popularity of "postmodern" approaches. Objections to spurious claims about an "objective" answer to the present problems, to class and other reductionisms which risk perpetuating voicelessness, and to dogmatism and theoretical rigidity are often well-founded, even if those who make such criticisms appear disturbingly "liberal" in their orientations. Thus, left activists genuinely interested in confronting the liberal capitalist status quo find themselves trapped between politically radical but theoretically flawed leftist orthodoxies and theoretically innovative but politically moderate "post"-theories.

**The idea of embracing the death drive is politically devastating and cannot create radical change—by definition embracing social death refuses any possibility of affirmative social change and instead risks more violence**

**Robinson, 04** (Andrew, recently completed his PhD in political theory at the University of Nottingham, Andrew Robinson - Theory Blog, 11/15, ZIZEK - notes and work in progress, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/)

Zizek's concept of the Act is exceedingly redemptive (although it is a negative 'redemption'). The Act is an uncoupling from society, a "symbolic death", a new creation, "the gesture of sublimation, of erasing the traces of one's past... and beginning afresh from a zero-point", via a "terrifying violence" Zizek identifies with the Freudian Death Drive. This Terror occurs in cases, such as Jacobinism and the Khmer Rouge, when a (pledged) group identifies itself with an entire society (FA 127). Zizek has a great deal of faith that the Act, by itself, can completely alter social reality (despite the fact that it seems to be purely individual). The Act redefines what counts as 'Good' by changing the coordinates of the reality principle (the possible) (DSST 167). For instance, Zizek celebrates politicians who defy the opinion polls, since opinion is always framed by conceptions of the possible, and such acts by politicians can change such conceptions (DSST 169; NB as Zizek half-admits in The Abyss of Freedom, such acts are as likely to leave the politician in question isolated; and Zizek does not investigate why some Acts change reality and others don't). The Act transgresses the legal and moral norm and redefines it, generating "a new shape of what counts as 'Good' ". It can be judged by rational criteria - but only those it forms itself, since it changes and recreates those standards which do not precede it (DSST 169-70). Zizek's "Good News" is that "it is possible to suspend the burden of the past, to cut the ropes which tie us to our past deeds, to wipe the slate and begin again from zero", via a sidestep splitting ontology from ethics and causality from responsibility (DSST 53); he advocates the possibility of "starting a new life 'from nothing' " by replacing one symbolic fiction with another, on the basis of an impetus from the outside (TS 331). The Act is a "passage through (symbolic) death and subsequent rebirth", and a "suicidal dimension" of "the subject's self-obliteration which always accompanies the act" (PF 225; NB the palingenetic overtones of such statements; NB also how the Act cannot create a blank slate like Zizek wants, since it hardly allows people to forget their entire language or leave/transform their bodies; NB also how this necessarily involves refounded, not overcoming, the problems of the present). So Zizek's endorsement of being reduced to the status of a Holocaust victim (which is what he means by "zero": see above) is that it has a longer-term redemptive role (albeit one that the subject - a vanishing mediator who dies in the course of the transformation - does not live to see, and one which is clearly not redemptive for those - the victims of Terror, or the family shot in The Usual Suspects, for instance - who are sacrificed by it). (NB also the mathematical model: we are reduced to "zero" presumably so that a leader can take on the role of the "One" and refound the symbolic order - which, however, presumably remains structurally unchanged). Psychoanalysis is for Zizek a "(symbolic) rebirth" and "(re)creation ex nihilo", producing "a thoroughly new configuration" of being (TS 212). On a similar subject: the negative nature of Zizek's category of the Act rules out the possibility of fighting for a particular positive content: "the only legitimization of a revolution is negative, the will to break with the Past", and revolutionaries cannot have a positive concept of the New Man or of something to be realised (CHU 131). As to where ethical projects come from, Zizek is reliant on the existence of a kind of positively-active negativity somewhete beyond human experience. In this context, it is worth noting that his ethical statements are nearly always passive-voice, eg. "the task today is precisely to..." (CHU 128).

I suspect Zizek is what Vaneigem calls an "active nihilist" - not a nihilist of the passive, accepting kind, but the kind of nihilist who throws a beer-glass against a wall, driven by a directionless refusal of the present (would Vaneigem's beer-glass thrower be committing a Zizekian Act? Quite possibly). Crucially, in Vaneigem's account active nihilists are only proto-revolutionary; to become revolutionary, they would have to take additional steps. Zizek seems to refuse such steps (which mostly involve identifying with and engaging in resistances in everyday life) on principle (see RESISTANCE), and therefore remains trapped permanently at the level of active nihilism.

**The core assumptions of the death drive theory negate ethics. Only the rejection of this "metaphysics of aggression" enables human responsibility.**

**Lear** **2k** Jonathan, Philosophy Professor at the University of Chicago, Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life, Page 131-132

By 1920 Freud is ready to break up what he has come to see as a fantasized unity of mental functioning. The mind can no longer be understood in terms of the pleasure principle, but instead of living with the gap, he posits a “beyond.” It is in this way that Freud takes himself to be explaining aggression. Aggression is now interpreted as the death drive diverted outward. It is precisely this move which locks us into an inescapably negative teleogy. Let us just assume (for the sake of argument, though I think it true) that humans are aggressive animals, and that dealing with human aggression is a serious psychological and social problem. The question remains: how might one deal with it? But if, as Freud does, one interprets aggression as the most obvious manifestation of one of the two primordial forces in the universe, the answer would seem to be: there is no successful way. My first inclination is to say that this leads to a pessimistic view of the human condition; but this isn’t really the issue. My second inclination is to say it leads to a limited view of the human condition; but even this doesn’t get to the heart of the problem. The point here is not to endorse an ontic optimism – that if we didn’t adopt this view, we could shape life in nonaggressive ways – but to confront an ontological insight: that Freud’s interpretation is an instance of bad faith. The metaphysical basicness of the death drive implies a kind of metaphysical intractability to the phenomenon of human aggression. As a matter of empirical fact, humans may be aggressive animals – and the fact of human aggression may be difficult to deal with. It may be experienced as intractable. But to raise this purported intractability to a metaphysical principle is to obliterate the question of responsibility. And it is to cover over – by precluding – what might turn out to be a significant empirical possibilities.

**There is no significance in embracing the death drive—the entire theory is a way to let oppressive social forces off the hook by locating the source of oppression within one’s self**

**Robinson, 05** (Andrew, recently completed his PhD in political theory at the University of Nottingham, Theory and Event, 8/1, “The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique”, projectmuse)

Guattari's critique of psychoanalysis makes clear the myths which underlie it.  'Psychoanalysis transforms and deforms the unconscious by forcing it to pass through the grid of its system of inscription and representation.  For psychoanalysis, the unconscious is always already there, genetically programmed, structured, and finalized on objectives of conformity to social norms'104.  Similarly, Reich has already exposed a predecessor of the idea of "constitutive lack" - the Freudian "death instinct" - as a denial that "I don't know".  It is, he says, a metaphysical attempt to explain as yet inexplicable phenomena, an attempt which gets in the way of fact-finding about these phenomena105.  He provides a detailed clinical rebuttal of the idea of the "death instinct" which is equally apt as an attack on Lacanians (who seem unaware of Reich's intervention).  In Reich's view, the masochistic tendencies Freud associates with the "death instinct" are secondary drives arising from anxiety, and are attributable to 'the disastrous effect of social conditions on the biopsychic apparatus.  This entailed the necessity of criticizing the social conditions which created the neuroses - a necessity which the hypothesis of a biological will to suffer had circumvented'106.  The idea of the "death instinct" leads to a cultural philosophy in which suffering is assumed to be inevitable, whereas Reich's alternative - to attribute neurosis to frustrations with origins in the social system - leads to a critical sociological stance107.  The relevance of Reich's critique to the political theory of constitutive lack is striking.  The "death instinct" is connected to an idea of primordial masochism which, in the form of "aphanisis" or "subjective destitution", recurs throughout Lacanian political theory.  Zizek in particular advocates masochism, in the guise of "shooting at" or "beating" oneself, as a radical gesture which reveals the essence of the self and breaks the constraints of an oppressive reality108, although the masochistic gesture is present in all Lacanian theorists.  The death instinct is typified by Zizek as a pathological (in the Kantian sense), contingent attitude which finds satisfaction in the process of self-blockage109.  It is identical with the Lacanian concept of jouissance or enjoyment.  For him, 'enjoyment (jouissance) is not to be equated with pleasure: enjoyment is precisely "pleasure in unpleasure"; it designates the paradoxical satisfaction procured by a painful encounter with a Thing that perturbs the equilibrium of the pleasure principle.  In other words, enjoyment is located "beyond the pleasure principle"'110.  It is also the core of the self, since enjoyment is 'the only "substance" acknowledged by psychoanalysis', and 'the subject fully "exists" only through enjoyment'111.  Primordial masochism is therefore central to the Lacanian concept of the Real, which depends on there being a universal moment at which active desire - sometimes given the slightly misleading name of the "pleasure principle" - is suspended, not for a greater or delayed pleasure, but out of a direct desire for unpleasure (i.e. a primary reactive desire).  Furthermore, this reactive desire is supposed to be ontologically prior to active desire.  Dominick LaCapra offers a similar but distinct critique to my own, claiming that Lacanian and similar theories induce a post-traumatic compulsion repetition or an 'endless, quasi-transcendental grieving that may be indistinguishable from interminable melancholy'112. Reich has already provided a rebuttal of "primordial masochism", which, paradoxically given Zizek's claims to radicalism, was denounced by orthodox Freudians as communist propaganda.  In Reich's view, masochism operates as a relief at a lesser pain which operates as armouring against anxiety about an underlying trauma113.  Regardless of what one thinks of Reich's specific account of the origins of masochism, what is crucial is his critique of the idea of a death drive.  'Such hypotheses as are criticised here are often only a sign of therapeutic failure.  For if one explains masochism by a death instinct, one confirms to the patient his [sic] alleged will to suffer'114.  Thus, Lacanian metaphysics conceal Lacanians' encouragement of a variety of neurosis complicit with oppressive social realities.  Politically, the thesis of primordial masochism provides a mystifying cover for the social forces which cause and benefit from the contingent emergence of masochistic attachments (i.e. sadistic power apparatuses).  One could compare this remark to Butler's claim that Zizek 'defends the trauma of the real... over and against a different kind of threat'115.

**The death drive doesn’t motivate all human actions.**

**Allen 01** Richard Allen, Assocaite Professor of Cinema Studies at the NYU, and Malcolm Turvey, managing editor of the journal, October, 2001 Theory and the Arts, p. 29-30, Scholar

Structuralism is now out of fashion, and the later Barthes was partly responsible for this. One of the theories that has replaced structuralism in study of arts is Lacanian psychoanalysis. Once associated with a broadly structualist analysis of culture, a new Lacanianism has risen in a more potent form in the writings of the prolific Slovenian theoretician Slavoj Zizek, one that is closer to Lacan’s own surrealist roots. Lacan rewrites Freud’s psychological theory of unconscious agency as a philosophical theory that describes the essential or constitutive paradox of self-representation. Lacanian theory has the aura of a scientific theory that makes empirical claims by borrowing the language of psychological and linguistic theories, but is actually immune from empirical confirmation and refutation. Zizek bases his interpretation of Lacan on the Hagelian dictum that the use of language and singles out human beings emerges against the background of an essential abyss of non-meaning, of the empty nothingness that is organic life. Human beings, when they begin to use language and strive to attain self-consciousness, negate, or conceal this essential abyss of nothingness by entering into the pre-existing structure of language that is concrete, inorganic, inert and external. Human consciousness and its products, including culture, thus embody a subjection to an external and therefore alien authority. This subjection is at once essential to concealing the abyss of nothingness that is organic life and, at the same time, is only made possible and sustained by the existence of that concealed abyss and the ‘pressure’ exerted by it. This abyss of nothingness (called ‘the Real’) forms a traumatic core at the heart of human consciousness and culture that always threatens to disrupt the inert structure of human civilization that is concealment serves to make possible. For Zizek, the ego and its social and culture that always threatens to disrupt the inert structure of human civilization that its concealment serves to make possible. For Zizek, the ego and its social and cultural analogues grow ever more rigid and paranoid in order to prevent the irruption of ‘the Real’, whose role in sustaining the social structure through a negative force or pressure is thereby only augmented and made more insistent. For Zizek, ‘what we call “culture” is…in its very ontological status, the reign of the dead over life, i.e. the form in which the “death drive” assumes its positive existence’ (Zizek 1992: 54).

**Death being good or not isn’t a prior question** – you still vote aff due to the educational benefit of learning economics which is pedagogically beneficial

#### Death precedes all other impacts – it ontologically destroys the subject and prevents any alternative way of knowing the world

\***death is bad** – destroys the subject of the individual and means it’s impossible to exert value, which means there is no opportunity cost to voting negative, death prevents an individual for having the option of exerting some sort of being which means value to live is both inevitable and subjective because it is impossible to determine the value of another so the only common denominator to prevent is death – outweighs all your standing reserve impacts

**Paterson, 03** – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81

In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### More than particles

Myers 09 – P. Z., biologist and associate professor at the University of Minnesota, Morris, The Dead are Dead, <http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2009/12/the_dead_are_dead.php>

I have heard that first argument so many times, and it is facile and dishonest. We are not just "energy". We are a pattern of energy and matter, a very specific and precise arrangement of molecules in movement. **That can be destroyed**. When you've built a pretty sand castle and the tide comes in and washes it away, the grains of sand are still all there, but what you've lost is the arrangement that you worked to generate, and which you **appreciated**. Reducing a complex functional order to nothing but the constituent parts is an insult to the work. If I were to walk into the Louvre and set fire to the Mona Lisa, and afterwards take a drive down to Chartres and blow up the cathedral, would anyone defend my actions by saying, "well, science says matter and energy cannot be created or destroyed, therefore, Rabid Myers did no harm, and we'll all just enjoy viewing the ashes and rubble from now on"? No. That's crazytalk. We also wouldn't be arguing that the painting and the architecture have transcended this universe to enter another, nor would such a pointless claim ameliorate our loss in this universe. The rest of his argument is quantum gobbledy-gook. The behavior of subatomic particles is not a good guide to what to expect of the behavior of large bodies. A photon may have no rest mass, but I can't use this fact to justify my grand new weight loss plan; quantum tunnelling does not imply that I can ignore doors when I amble about my house. **People are not particles**! We are the product of the aggregate behavior of the many particles that constitute our bodies, and you cannot ignore the importance of these higher-order relationships when talking about our fate. The rational atheist view is simpler, clearer, and I think, more true. Lanza's sister is dead, and so is mine; that means the features of their independent existence that were so precious to us, that made them interesting, thinking, behaving human beings, have **ceased to exist**. The 20-watts of energy are dissipating as heat, and can't be brought back. They are lost to us, and someday we will end, too. We should feel grief. Pretending that they have 'transcended' into some novel quantum mechanical state in which their consciousness persists, or that they are shaking hands with some anthropomorphic spiritual myth in never-never land, does a disservice to ourselves. The pain is real. Don't deny it. Use it to look at the ones you love who still live and see what you can do to make our existence now a little better, and perhaps a little more conducive to keeping our energies patterned usefully a little longer.

### Gender

### 2ac fem ir

#### Reps don’t affect reality – material structure are more important and they cede the political

**Tuathail 96 –** [Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct]

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is **inadequate** by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Critiques of realism ignore its ability to promote cooperation and diplomacy- complete rejection turns alt solvency. It’s better to take small steps like the plan

**Murray, 97 -** professor of politics at the University of Wales (Alistair, Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, netlibrary)

Given these problems, the attempt to establish an alternative, feminist epistemology falls apart. The aim to provide a 'new' theory of human nature just looks unnecessary when it is noted that the conventional view of the human character derived from realism is in fact simultaneously moral and immoral, 'both conflictual and cooperative', as Tickner demands. Similarly, the concern to redefine power amounts to little more than a sophisticated word game. 'Mutual enablement' ultimately sounds like some dreadful slogan dreamt up by a management consultant. The fact that realist theorists define power in terms of the ability to coerce does not mean that they neglect the ability to persuade as a tool in international politics, only that they define power in more rigorous terms than feminists, calling each by a different name to avoid confusion. Nor does it mean that, by doing this, they neglect the ability of international actors to co-operate, or that they exclude from consideration the co-operative basis upon which power relies or the co-operative objectives to which it tends. If Tickner had read beyond the first chapter of Politics among Nations, she might have come across phrases such as the balance of power, in which curious things called 'alliances' and 'grand coalitions' co-operatively generate power towards co-operative ends. Conflict is not perpetual in the realist vision of international relations, and coalition building is ultimately just as essential to the realist account of international politics as it is to feminist accounts. Consequently, it is not surprising that the third strut of this new feminist epistemology, a broader notion of national security, seems simply unnecessary. Acknowledging the interdependence of human security in an age of nuclear holocaust and environmental degeneration would hardly seem to be a preserve of feminism. What of everything that George Kennan has said on this subject over the last forty years? Nor can we accept the notion that we need to redefine conflict resolution to focus more on mutually beneficial oufeomes, when realism is deeply concerned with the amelioration of difference by diplomacy. What of the nine points with which Morgenthau concludes Politics among Nations? Nor can we accept the notion that 'maternal thinking' and a female, contextual morality are required to attempt to confine conflict to non-violent means. A persistent theme of realism is that humility of self and toleration of others are the foremost moral imperatives, that conflict should not be permitted to become an ideological war of absolutes in which all enemies are monsters, all actions are legitimate, and all peaces are but punitive armistices. One ultimately has to question the need for a specifically feminist theory of international relations. We currently do not have two radically opposed standpoints, masculine and feminine, but a unified human standpoint which, with modifications, serves us reasonably well. Tickner, of course, cannot accept any of this: essential to her entire argument — indeed, her entire self-identity — is the notion that practices such as 'coalition building' are very specifically a 'female strategy', beyond the wit of conventional — male — theorists to master. She is careful to avoid suggesting that women are innately more virtuous than men, proposing only that they have been socialised into more virtuous behaviour. She is careful to avoid the suggestion that this implies that masculine perspectives are to be entirely replaced by feminist perspectives, proposing only that the two must be integrated until such time as gender can be transcended as a factor. 63 But a central problem remains. Not only does her position require some rather fast rewriting of the literature of international relations theory, but it necessitates a serious distortion of our understanding of international relations itself. The inability to discover an independent feminist position means that, in order to justify the establishment of a separate feminist approach to international politics, one must be artificially constructed by appropriating elements from conventional theory and labelling them as female in orientation, such as 'the female strategy of coalition building', and grouping what remains into an alternative set of negative, male strategies, such as that of conflict, against which feminist strategies can be contrasted and thus privileged.64 In the process of this act of intellectual vandalism, the essential ambiguity of the political, and the essential duality of its concepts, are lost. It is simply not enough to divide the concepts and categories of international relations into two groupings; Tickner must, in addition, be able to privilege the female set in order to demonstrate the necessity of a feminist perspective. Consequently, it becomes necessary to assume that, if co-operation is a female strategy, all co-operation is positive, whereas all conflict, being, of course, a male strategy, is negative. The problem is that actors frequently conflict for moral ends and co-operate for immoral ends. Thus, if the progressive critique of realism reaches its highest form in feminism, the progressive urge similarly reaches its apogee, a cancer growing within theory, so incapable of fostering a position of its own that it must steal the realist's clothes in order to survive, oblivious of the damage which this conceptual mugging does to their utility.

**Focus on strategic deterrence and democracy are key to averting crisis escalation – reject the infinite number of root causes that debilitate action**

**Moore 4** – Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. He formerly served as the first Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State. (John Norton, Winter, “Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle”, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis Law)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. n158 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come. [\*394] A useful framework for thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State and War, n159 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high-risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision to go to war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high-risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant - I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who are disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposed to high-risk behavior. We might also want to keep open the possibility that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence. Nondemocracies' leaders can have different perceptions of the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, the key to war avoidance is understanding that major international war is critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three - specifically an absence of [\*395] democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high-risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk. n160 III. Testing the Hypothesis Hypotheses, or paradigms, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms. In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war;" there are simply too many variables. We should insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars. That is, in looking, for example, at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence? n161 And although it, by itself, does not prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in non-war settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy. That is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

#### Security isn’t fundamental – the alt causes conservative backlash and threats real

Nunes, 12 [Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies, João Nunes, Security Dialogue 2012 43: 345,Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK, p. sage publications]

Conclusion This article advanced three main arguments. First, the commitment to politicization that constitutes the cornerstone of critical security studies has been detrimentally affected by a tendency to conceive security as having an undesirable logic. This happens at a time when critique is blunted by the proliferation of the ‘critical’ label and by the successes of critical security studies in highlighting the problems with predominant ways of thinking and doing security. Next, it was argued that security as emancipation can potentially provide a platform **for reclaiming** **the political** in critical security studies. By taking insecurity as its starting point, by conceiving theory as a form of praxis and by mobilizing immanent critique, this approach promises to address the current blind spots of politicization. Finally, the article provided a revision of security as emancipation that addresses the shortcomings of the versions provided by Booth and Wyn Jones. Two themes are central to this revised version: recognition of the political relations and structures underpinning the reality of security, and engagement with the multifaceted nature of power as determination of action, government and domination. This article has suggested that a re-engagement with – as well as reconsideration of – security as emancipation is crucial for addressing the current impasse in critical security studies. As in previous moments in the development of this field, there is much to gain from dialogue between approaches. However, this discussion also suggests that it is perhaps time to abandon the idea of a division of labour between the deconstructive and reconstructive sides of critical security studies. This was at the heart of the Copenhagen School’s reluctance to consider at length the transformative potential of its work.14 It was also accepted by Booth, for whom deconstructing security is runs the risk of becoming a conservative stance that diverts attention from the ‘real’ condition of insecurity. In contrast with this division of labour, this article has begun to show the fruitfulness of a cumulative vision of critique. Indeed, the reconsideration of security as emancipation proposed here points towards a notion of critique that is committed to deconstruction but also unashamedly reconstructive. It brings together insights that for too long have been kept apart in the critical literature, and introduces other insights that so far have been insufficiently considered: that security has no fundamental logic; that a detailed analysis of its assumptions and effects can be achieved by problematizing its reality and by working with a broad notion of power; that one can make judgments about the desirability of security arrangements by considering structures and relations of vulnerability and disadvantage; and that, on the basis of this, it is possible to identify potential for transformation and devise strategies to achieve it. The conjunction of these insights can help realize the promise of the critical security literature and provide critique with a renewed strength and sense of purpose.

**Shocks to the democratic system are the ONLY propensity for conflict—globalization and liberal norms have eradicated warfare and structural violence—every field study proves**

**HORGAN 9** is Director of the Center for Science at Stevens Institute of Technology, former senior writer at Scientific American, B.A. from Columbia and an M.S. from Columbia (John, “The End of the Age of War,” Dec 7 http://www.newsweek.com/id/225616/page/1

The economic crisis was supposed to increase violence around the world. The truth is that we are now living in one of the most peaceful periods since war first arose 10 or 12 millennia ago. The relative calm of our era, say scientists who study warfare in history and even prehistory, belies the popular, pessimistic notion that war is so deeply rooted in our nature that we can never abolish it. In fact, war seems to be a largely cultural phenomenon, which culture is now helping us eradicate. Some scholars now even cautiously speculate that the era of traditional war—fought by two uniformed, state-sponsored armies—might be drawing to a close. "War could be on the verge of ceasing to exist as a substantial phenomenon," says John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio State University. That might sound crazy, but consider: if war is defined as a conflict between two or more nations resulting in at least 1,000 deaths in a year, there have been no wars since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and no wars between major industrialized powers since World War II. Civil wars have also declined from their peak in the early 1990s, when fighting tore apart Rwanda, the Balkans, and other regions. Most armed conflicts now consist of low-level guerrilla campaigns, insurgencies, and terrorism—what Mueller calls the "remnants of war." These facts would provide little comfort if war's remnants were nonetheless killing millions of people—but they're not. Recent studies reveal a clear downward trend. In 2008, 25,600 combatants and civilians were killed as a direct result of armed conflicts, according to the University of Uppsala Conflict Data Program in Sweden. Two thirds of these deaths took place in just three trouble spots: Sri Lanka (8,400), Afghanistan (4,600), and Iraq (4,000). Uppsala's figures exclude deaths from "one-sided conflict," in which combatants deliberately kill unarmed civilians, and "indirect" deaths from war-related disease and famine, but even when these casualties are included, annual war-related deaths from 2004 to 2007 are still low by historical standards. Acts of terrorism, like the 9/11 attacks or the 2004 bombing of Spanish trains, account for less than 1 percent of fatalities. In contrast, car accidents kill more than 1 million people a year. The contrast between our century and the previous one is striking. In the second half of the 20th century, war killed as many as 40 million people, both directly and indirectly, or 800,000 people a year, according to Milton Leitenberg of the University of Maryland. He estimates that 190 million people, or 3.8 million a year, died as a result of wars and state--sponsored genocides during the cataclysmic first half of the century. Considered as a percentage of population, the body count of the 20th century is comparable to that of blood-soaked earlier cultures, such as the Aztecs, the Romans, and the Greeks. By far the most warlike societies are those that preceded civilization. War killed as many as 25 percent of all pre-state people, a rate 10 times higher than that of the 20th century, estimates anthropologist Lawrence Keeley of the University of Illinois. Our ancestors were not always so bellicose, however: there is virtually no clear-cut evidence of lethal group aggression by humans prior to 12,000 years ago. Then, "warfare appeared in the evolutionary trajectory of an increasing number of societies around the world," says anthropologist Jonathan Haas of Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. He attributes the emergence of warfare to several factors: growing population density, environmental stresses that diminished food sources, and the separation of people into culturally distinct groups. "It is only after the cultural foundations have been laid for distinguishing 'us' from 'them,' " he says, "that raiding, killing, and burning appear as a complex response to the external stress of environmental problems." Early civilizations, such as those founded in Mesopotamia and Egypt 6,000 years ago, were extremely warlike. They assembled large armies and began inventing new techniques and technologies for killing, from horse-drawn chariots and catapults to bombs. But nation-states also developed laws and institutions for resolving disputes nonviolently, at least within their borders. These cultural innovations helped reduce the endless, tit-for-tat feuding that plagued pre-state societies. A host of other cultural factors may explain the more recent drop-off in international war and other forms of social violence. One is a surge in democratic rather than totalitarian governance. Over the past two centuries democracies such as the U.S. have rarely if ever fought each other. Democracy is also associated with low levels of violence within nations. Only 20 democratic nations existed at the end of World War II; the number has since more than quadrupled. Yale historian Bruce Russett contends that international institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union also contribute to this "democratic peace" phenomenon by fostering economic interdependence. Advances in civil rights for women may also be making us more peaceful. As women's education and economic opportunities rise, birthrates fall, decreasing demands on governmental and medical services and depletion of natural resources, which can otherwise lead to social unrest. Better public health is another contributing factor. Over the past century, average life spans have almost doubled, which could make us less willing to risk our lives by engaging in war and other forms of violence, proposes Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker. At the same time, he points out, globalization and communications have made us increasingly interdependent on, and empathetic toward, others outside of our immediate "tribes." Of course, the world remains a dangerous place, vulnerable to disruptive, unpredictable events like terrorist attacks. Other looming threats to peace include climate change, which could produce droughts and endanger our food supplies; overpopulation; and the spread of violent religious extremism, as embodied by Al Qaeda. A global financial meltdown or ecological catastrophe could plunge us back into the kind of violent, Hobbesian chaos that plagued many pre--state societies thousands of years ago. "War is not intrinsic to human nature, but neither is peace," warns the political scientist Nils Petter Gleditsch of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. So far the trends are positive. If they continue, who knows? World peace—the dream of countless visionaries and -beauty--pageant -contestants—or something like it may finally come to pass.

**Social science proves—multipolarity supports the natural incentive to seek status by fighting**

**Wohlforth, 09** – professor of government at Dartmouth (William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Affairs, January, project muse)

The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29] Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

#### Our advantage isn’t based on myopic security discourse- multiple independent fields support our hegemony advantage, prefer our advantage because it is interdisciplinary

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from **neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology** that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

#### Permutation do the plan and non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative–their links misconstrue realism and the state can help us

**Lind 2005** (Michael, Executive Editor of the National Interest, “Of Arms and the Woman,” Jan 20, http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt)

The first thing that must be said about the feminist critique of realism is that it is by no means incompatible with realism, properly understood. In fact, realist theory can hardly be recognized in the feminist caricature of it. Take the idea of the innate human propensity for conflict. Although some realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau have confused the matter (often under the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr) with misleading talk of "original sin," the controlling idea of realism is that there is an ineradicable potential for conflict between human beings--"men" in the inclusive, gender-neutral sense-- when they are organized in groups. Realism is not about conflict between individual men, that is, males; if it were, it would be a theory of barroom brawls or adolescent male crime. It is about conflict between rival communities, and those communities include women and men alike.

Feminist critics of realism, then, begin by attacking a straw man, or a straw male. Even worse, they tend to indulge in the stereotypes that they otherwise abhor: aggression is "male," conciliation is "female." To their credit, most feminist theorists are aware of this danger, ever mindful of their dogma that all sexual identity is socially constructed, ever fearful that they will hear the cry of "Essentialist!" raised against them. Thus Enloe, in an earlier book called Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, struggles with how to answer what she calls "the `What about Margaret Thatcher?' taunt."

Her answer is that women like Margaret Thatcher and Jeane Kirkpatrick reinforce the patriarchy by making international conflict look "less man-made, more people-made and thus more legitimate and harder to reverse." Enloe applies this analysis consistently--right-wing women like Phyllis Schlafly are pawns of the patriarchal-militarist power structure, while left-wing women like the Greenham Common Women are disinterested proponents of the good of humanity. Still, Enloe is troubled enough to return to the question: "some women's class aspirations and their racist fears lured them into the role of controlling other women for the sake of imperial rule." Admit that, however, and you are close to conceding the point about collective human behavior made by realists.

Then there is "the state." Here, too, there is nothing in realism that cannot accommodate many feminine observations about the particular patriarchal features of particular historic states. The realist definition of "the state" as a sovereign entity with an existence and a strategy distinct from that of individuals is very broad, including medieval duchies and ancient empires-- and, perhaps, female biker gangs. Realist theory holds no preference for the modern nation-state, though a word might be spoken in its defense. Again and again in feminist writings one encounters the claim that the modern nation- state is inherently "gendered," as though its predecessors--feudal dynastic regimes, theocratic empires, city-states, tribal amphictyonies--were not even more rigidly patriarchal.

Completely missing from such an analysis is any acknowledgement that the successes of feminism have been largely based on appeals to the universal norms governing citizens of the impersonal, bureaucratic nation-state. Those appeals would have made no sense in any previous political system. Notwithstanding this, feminist scholars tend to join free marketeers, multiculturalists and Wilsonians in their approval of the (mostly imaginary) dissolution of the nation-state in a new world order. If the nation-state is "gendered," Enloe reasons, then perhaps the post-national nonstate need not be: "Perhaps effective u.n. soldiering will call for a new kind of masculinity, one less reliant on misogyny, less insecure about heterosexual credentials." (If the recent "peacekeeping" of u.n. forces in Bosnia and Somalia shows anything, however, it is that a little more of the old masculinity may be necessary to prevent mass slaughter--and mass rape, too.)

**Feminism can’t explain international relations**

**LIND 2005** (Michael, Executive Editor of the National Interest, “Of Arms and the Woman,” Jan 20, http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt)

Though realist theory can survive, and perhaps even accommodate, many of the arguments of feminism with respect to collective conflict and state sovereignty, realism must reject the third aspect of the feminist criticism: the redefinition of security to mean social justice. From the Marxist left, feminists have picked up the argument that interstate violence is just one genre of "structural violence," which includes the economic oppression of lower classes by upper classes (Marxism) and the subordination of women to men by custom and by violence (feminism). But this notion merely disguises a change of subject as a change of approach. To say that mass rape by soldiers in wartime and wife-beating in societies at peace (excuse me, at "peace") are parts of the same phenomenon is to abandon any pretense of engaging in serious thinking about international relations. The result may be feminist theory, but it is not a theory of world politics. It is a theory of human society in general. When, as in "ecofeminism," the mistreatment of women by men in all societies, in peace and at war, is fused, as a subject of analysis, with the mistreatment of the ecosystem by humanity, one has a theory of everything, and a theory of everything is usually not very much

#### Their alternative is nihilist—it rejects all forms of political action that could improve the way society views gender.

**Whitworth 1994** - Assistant Professor of Political Science York University (Sandra, Feminism and International Relations, Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions, page 22-23)

This points also to the serious limitations involved in feminist post-modernist understandings of 'social construction'. While acknowledging that identities and meanings are never natural or universal, postmodernists locate the construction of those meanings almost exclusively in the play of an ambiguously defined power, organised through discourse. This means that identities and meanings are constructed in the absence of knowing actors, and more importantly, that there is very little that knowing actors can do to challenge those meanings or identities. The ways in which power manifests itself, the particular meanings and identities that emerge, seem almost inevitable. They are unrelated to prevailing material conditions or the activities of agents and institutions. Similarly, critics may describe the play of power in the construction of meaning, but cannot participate in changing it.63 As Marysia Zalewski writes: The post-modernist intention to challenge the power of dominant discourses in an attempt to lead those discourses into disarray is at first glance appealing, but we have to ask what will the replacement be? If we are to believe that all is contingent and we have no base on to which we can ground claims to truth, then 'power alone will determine the oufeome of competing truth claims'. Post-modernist discourse does not offer any criteria for choosing among competing explanations and thus has a tendency to lead towards nihilism - an accusation often levelled at the purveyors of post-modernism and to which they seem unable to provide any answer, except perhaps in the words of one post-modernist scholar 'what's wrong with nihilism'?64 Postmodernists are equally post-feminist, a title they sometimes adopt, for their analysis loses sight of the political imperatives which inform feminism: to uncover and change inequalities between women and men. As Ann Marie Goetz suggests, when many of the issues surrounding women and international relations are ones which concern the very survival of those women, postmodernism's continued back-pedalling and disclaimers are not only politically unacceptable, they are, more importantly, politically irresponsible.

#### Critiques of gender relations that do not pose concrete alternatives are destined to fail.

**Caprioli, 04** (“Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis” Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076).

If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female centered analysis seems equally biased. Such research would merely be gendercentric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of international relations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would offer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations. Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individuals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world.

#### Feminist thought just reproduces gender stereotypes

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Even when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend on a ‘re-thinking’ from the perspective of women. What is left unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domination between men and women. Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminism’s reliance on the experiences, behaviours and perceptions of ‘women’. As Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal ‘man’, long the focus of feminist critiques, has merely been replaced here with the essential and universal ‘woman’. And indeed, that notion of ‘woman’ not only ignores important differences amongst women, but it also reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarchy. Those women who do not fit the mould – who, for example, take up arms in military struggle – are quickly dismissed as expressing ‘negative’ or ‘inauthentic’ feminine values (the same accusation is more rarely made against men). In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR theorists such as Robert Reohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism. It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions about stereotypes. Radical feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as men do under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.